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Lucas Lixinski*
Much article and web space has been recently invested
in investigating the nature of the international legal
order, or, rather, in promoting specific visions of the
international legal order. This special issue of the Eras-
mus Law Review (ELR) is yet another contribution to
this growing body of literature, but one that adds a twist
which, we believe, may contribute positively to these
debates.
Before I get to that, though, let me just say that it has
been a real intellectual treat and a challenge to be a guest
editor to this issue of the ELR. I am deeply grateful to
Prof. Dr. Ellen Hey for all of her support along the way,
which makes her de facto the co-editor of this special
issue. I have found our rapport most fruitful, and she
has been essential to bringing the original idea for this
issue to fruition.
Now, this issue starts from the assumption that current
debates in international law seem to be informed by dif-
ferent narratives about the international legal order.
These narratives about ‘projects’ of the international
legal order are ways of thinking that in one way or
another attempt at explaining the convergences and
divergences of international legal rules and institutions.
More importantly, another assumption underlying the
impetus for this issue is that scholars who engage with
these debates about broader notions of the international
legal order most often engage with the ideas on a con-
ceptual level, or from the perspective of what is com-
monly referred to as ‘general’ international law, often
neglecting the contribution of ‘specialised’ fields of
international law to these narratives or projects. This
issue attempts to remedy that, by having articles written
by scholars who engage in specialised fields of interna-
tional law think about their areas as contributors not
only to the broader international legal project, but also
to one of the narratives of the legal international. The
main narratives referred to can be roughly labeled as
‘global administrative law’, ‘the constitutionalisation of
international law’, ‘international legal pluralism’, and
‘the fragmentation of international law’.
In broad terms, global administrative law (GAL) seeks
to map out the competence creep of different interna-
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tional institutions in relatively well-defined and con-
tained fields of action, and how the action of interna-
tional bureaucracies has contributed to the formation of
an international legal order beyond the consent of states.
This international legal order is patchy, composed of
many small clusters of autonomous international norma-
tivity each residing in its own institutional setting, such
as the United Nations Security Council, the World
Bank or the World Health Organisation. The legal order
portrayed resembles a pointillist painting, in which
many small and seemingly unconnected points form a
cohesive image, if seen from afar. Much of the GAL
project, though, seems to be concerned with the stories
about each of the points, not the bigger picture. Under-
lying these many smaller stories are common threads
inquiring into the legitimacy and accountability of inter-
national organisations, and therein lies the main norma-
tive claim of the GAL narrative.
The constitutionalisation of international law, by con-
trast, is a more ambitious project, which argues that the
international legal order beyond the state exists and has
a backbone, a foundational set of norms. It assumes as a
matter of fact that power is exercised at the international
level, and argues normatively as to the content of basic
norms. Scholars engaged in this narrative disagree as to
the foundational set of norms, depending on their uni-
versalist or functionalist perspective, with proposed can-
didates for the backbone(s) varying from jus cogens
norms to the UN Charter to the WTO Agreement to
environmental regimes, or several of these. The consti-
tutionalisation narrative in certain ways evokes Roman-
ticist landscape painting, in which a grand theme, clear-
ly central, orients the entirety of the painting, but in
which the subject matter is idealised.
International legal pluralism is in many ways both nar-
rative and counter-narrative. While much of the litera-
ture in this field seems to accept that there is such a
thing as an international legal order, international legal
pluralism is dedicated to a critique of the hegemonic
tendencies of this order. In particular, of its impulse to
turn the international legal order into simply a repro-
duction of European (or Western) understandings of
international law, and imposing them on the rest of the
world for the sake of an illusory unity. International
legal pluralism rightly points out that the narrative of
the constitutionalisation of international law draws
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almost exclusively on European constitutional models
(often the German model). Despite this critique, there
seems to be a faith in an international legal order beyond
the object of critique, but it is one that must take into
account the specificities of a broader spectrum of mem-
bership, to include the hitherto unheard voices. The
pluralist narrative starts from the assumption that there
is a global society, and that it is pluralistic and unequal,
in the sense that not all voices are given equal weight. It
then uses this assumption to normatively argue for the
use of law as a venue for hearing otherwise sidelined
voices. To a certain extent, the international legal plu-
ralism narrative connects to the Cubistic school of
painting, showing us a variety of perspectives on one
and the same object, but in the process loosing cohesive-
ness.
Lastly, the fragmentation of international law is seen
mostly as a counter-narrative to unity projects. It argues
that, as a matter of fact, international bodies multiply,
spheres of competence overlap, and there is little to no
concerted action in the way of finding some coherence
amidst this cacophony of international legal norms and
institutions. It largely provides a realist account of inter-
national legal order and as far as instruments for main-
taining unity are concerned it points to a few basic rules
about the interrelationship of rules of law, such as sys-
temic integration, which is the main suggestion of the
International Law Commission’s Report on the subject.
Fragmentation narratives resemble a painting in the
realist tradition, showing a crystal clear picture of an
object, with every crack and cranny that is to be dis-
cerned, but the bigger picture often remaining obscure.
Realism in painting works largely as a reaction to
Romanticism, to the same extent that fragmentation is a
reaction to constitutionalisation, but the realist painting,
like fragmentation, declares as part of its agenda to have
no agenda but the faithful depiction of the subjects, and
because of that is susceptible to being captured by any
agenda.
These descriptions are, of course, broad generalisations,
and scholars who associate themselves with anyone of
these narratives may find the above characterisations
over-simplistic. But they should suffice for our present
purposes. What is important to highlight is that each of
these narrative projects brings different elements to the
table, by focusing on different methods, actors, political
projects and general assumptions about international
law and its role.
This issue of ELR proposes to explore the contributions
of the various narratives about the international legal
order to debates on specific areas of international law.
By doing so, we hope to be able to show the impacts of
these different narratives in the interpretation and appli-
cation of international law.
1. The Post-State Move in
These Narratives
All of these four narratives to a certain extent respond to
a need to affirm the international legal universe as a
post-state sort of order. The big question is who the
actors succeeding states are, and, to that, each project
has a different alternative.
Monika Ambrus’s contribution, discussing global water
governance through the lenses of both GAL and consti-
tutionalisation, speaks loudly to this point. She reminds
us that international law (in her case, international water
law), due to a pressing need to affirm its relevance, has
attempted to free itself from the ‘inter-state’ logic that
had been around since there was such a thing as interna-
tional law. Nikolas Rajkovic also reminds us of that, in
discussing the ‘archaeology’ (in the Foucauldian sense)
of the notion of fragmentation and the use of spatial
metaphors to explain the international legal order.
Ambrus, in focusing on the constitutionalisation and
GAL narratives of the international legal order, makes
the fairly intuitive transition from the particular to the
more general; in other words, she starts from the
assumption that both the constitutionalisation and the
GAL narratives shift their attentions away from states
and towards international institutions. These interna-
tional institutions can hold their subjects (the states who
until recently were the equal sovereign masters of the
international legal order) to account, and thereby
advance a project of the legal international. The frag-
mentation (counter-)narrative, on the other hand,
instead of focusing on institutions, rather focuses on
regimes. This may seem like a trivial distinction (after
all, regimes are implemented by institutions), but it also
highlights the fact that the fragmentation project is, first
and foremost, an epistemological one, as opposed to, for
instance, GAL, which presents a much more teleologi-
cal means of telling the same story (at least to the extent
it is more concerned with the actual purposes it assigns
international law, instead of ‘apolitically’ debating its
classification).
And then there is pluralism, which, as we will see below,
does not go towards the more general, and, rather, goes
to the more specific. Because it argues in favor of forgot-
ten voices, a natural step in executing the pluralist proj-
ect is to penetrate and debunk the ‘singularity’ of the
state, identifying internal dissonances, and asking social
movements, rather than official state authorities, about
the goals of the international legal project. By creating
smaller units, the pluralist project in fact opens an ave-
nue for the total reconfiguration of the composition of
the international legal order. Not only are social move-
ments within a state brought into the mix, but they are
also allowed to group themselves across those (now
meaningless) borders. Transnational social movements
become the actor of choice, and thus, in a way, the inter-
national legal project is democratised. Of course, the
risk is that it loses any semblance of coherence, because
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of the many configurations of social movements, and the
fact that the same individual has multiple facets to its
identity, and can therefore be represented simultaneous-
ly by many different social movements.
That is one aspect of ‘bottom-up’ revision of traditional
categories of actors in accounts of the international legal
order. The other one is folded into a subset of the con-
stitutionalisation narrative, under the term ‘humanisa-
tion’ of international law. Vassilis Tzevelekos’ contribu-
tion engages precisely with this idea, focusing on the
contribution of international human rights law to the
humanisation of international law, and, consequently,
the place of human rights in a constitutionalist account
of the international legal order. He discusses how
humanisation challenges the horizontality of interna-
tional law (in the sense of it being based on relations
between equally sovereign states), but, at the end of the
day, still falls short, because humanisation is for the
most part restricted to international human rights law,
and the spillover effects into general international law
have, he suggests, been overestimated. Even if some
would also argue international criminal law1 and inter-
national heritage law2 as participating in the humanisa-
tion of international law, this is still only a small subset
of international law, and not enough to, in a constitu-
tionalist framework, challenge the state-centric nature of
international law from below the state. What we are left
with are, again, institutions. The biggest contribution of
international human rights law, Tzevelekos argues, was
to create the idea of an ‘international community’
through the notion of erga omnes obligations.
2. The Colonial and
Emancipatory Potentials of
Narratives
Nikolas Rajkovic’s contribution discusses the notion of
spatial metaphors applied to international law, and how,
when ‘fragmentation’ came along in the international
legal vernacular, the very choice of word implied an
uncritical acceptance of fragmentation as continuity, but
disguised as change. The only change here is that inter-
national law’s traditional division into territorial states
shifted towards a division into legal regimes. But that
change undermined any subversive potential there could
have been to fragmentation as a means to explain the
international legal order, and thus the idea of fragmen-
tation as a counter-narrative to the notion of an interna-
tional legal order does not hold true; in fact, fragmenta-
tion is, too, a project that constitutes a legal order, even
if it is one made of a different element (regimes, as
opposed to states). If the shift towards regimes could
1. Antonio Cassese, The Human Dimension of International Law: Selected
Papers, 2008.
2. Francesco Francioni, ‘The Human Dimension of International Cultural
Heritage Law: An Introduction’, EJIL, 22(1) (2011), 9–16.
add some emancipatory potential to international law,
the fact that those are the same unchallenged regimes
imposed by colonisers is problematic, especially if one
considers that the move from states to regimes in fact
cloaks these regimes in a veneer of ‘apolitical neutrality’,
while in effect perpetuating the politics of the (imperial-
ly-minded) states that established those regimes to begin
with.
In this sense, fragmentation, much like constitutionali-
sation, is related to a Cartesian / Positivist logic that
seems at odds with reality, at least to the extent this log-
ic can seem as effecting a white, male, property-owner
mentality reminiscent of those whose ideas mattered
when Cartesian thought first came about in the 17th
century.
As a response to this Cartesian logic, the only challenger
seems to be international legal pluralism. Legal plural-
ism is often hailed as a powerful means to critique and
save the international legal order from itself (thereby
reconstituting it). Third World Approaches to Interna-
tional Law (TWAIL), for instance, an increasingly
influential critical school of thought in international
legal scholarship, seems to embody this proposition, to
the extent it proposes that international law opens its
metaphorical ears to voices coming from the third
world, often forgotten by a set of international legal
regimes and institutions created by, and for, imperial (or
imperially-minded) states. Notably, while TWAIL
began as a critique of how third world states should be
brought into the conversation, second-generation
TWAIL focuses instead on how non-state actors (in
particular social movements) are in fact the voices
excluded from international law, at least if one considers
how susceptible (third world) state authorities are to
influence by other (first world) state authorities and
actors (legal or illegal).3
If we are on board with the notion of (second genera-
tion) TWAIL as mirroring a trend in international legal
pluralist debate, the critique is laid out. The big ques-
tion that remains is what that reconstituted order would
look like. In other words, what is the international law
narrated through the lenses of pluralism?
The big problem with trying to answer this question is
that it commits the narrative to a certain project of the
international legal order. And this commitment, as
Marjan Ajevski argues in his article in this issue, engen-
ders an attempt at hegemony. If constitutionalism and
fragmentation, as we saw above, represents a hegemonic
commitment to a Western European mode of thought,
pluralism, if taken beyond the point of critique, also
becomes hegemonic the moment it commits to a set of
values and normative assumptions. Ajevski’s article
focuses primarily on the constitutional narrative as
applied to the field of international criminal law, but he
extends this suggestion to the other narratives as well.
3. B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifes-
to’, International Community Law Review, 3 (2006).
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3. Pluralism (from Below) or
Fragmentation (from
Above)? Perspectives
Perhaps because of the hegemonic critique made by
Ajevski, there is no agreement as to what the content or
normative aspiration of any of these narratives is. I out-
lined above that the characterisations this introduction
works with are rough and borderline caricatures, but
nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of international
legal pluralism, especially if one considers the definition
of pluralism in European legal circles.
‘Constitutional pluralism’, described in Surabhi Ranga-
nathan’s article as a ‘fabulous creature’ (in the same way
you would describe a dragon or a unicorn as a fabulous
creature, out of a fable), has long been advocated by the
European Union (EU). ‘Constitutional pluralism’ is the
notion that the constitutional vision for the EU is in fact
attentive to its own democratic deficit, and addresses it
by being more deferential to national courts. However,
the problem here is precisely that EU constitutional
pluralism is by definition court-centric, whereas plural-
ism is about bringing non-state actors into the conversa-
tion. Courts in dialogue with themselves only reinforce
pre-existing institutional structures, and thereby ‘con-
stitutional pluralism’ is only another version of constitu-
tionalism. The appropriation of the pluralist terminolo-
gy means the EU lending itself some of the pluralist
narrative’s credibility, while in effect doing nothing to
actually correct its own imbalances.
More than a terminological misuse, though, what this
example shows is that there is an inherent problem in
these narratives with definition and perspectives. For
instance, something that can look like pluralism from
below looks like fragmentation from above. As discussed
above, the analytical tools are somewhat different (a crit-
ical ontology for pluralism, a reaffirming epistemology
for fragmentation), as is the focus (actors versus
regimes), but these are more reflective of the politics of
each narrative than of the situation on the ground. In
other words, a situation can be told by each of these lens-
es very similarly, but lead to entirely opposite normative
judgments, depending on the value (pluralism is good,
fragmentation is bad) and political (pluralism is openly
leftist, fragmentation is self-purportedly ‘neutral’) as-
cribed to each of these narratives.
At the same time, as Surabhi Ranganathan’s contribu-
tion points out, the implementation of pluralism entails
a framing of the terms of the debate, and that means
accepting notions that are indigenous to GAL. So, what
from the outside (conceptualisation) is pluralism, from
the inside (implementation) becomes GAL.
Surabhi Ranganathan’s contribution discusses the
India-US Nuclear Deal from the points of view of the
four narratives that are the object of this special issue.
Starting from what seems to be its conventional telling
as an example of fragmentation of international law,
Ranganathan deconstructs that telling, and proceeds to
narrate the deal respectively through the lenses of plu-
ralism, constitutionalisation and GAL. And, in narrat-
ing the deal as an instance of pluralism, she reminds us
that GAL techniques can give direction to the potential
for contestation offered by pluralism (even if it does
imply making a choice in favor of institutions). In this
sense, perspectives become not only different sides to
the same object, but can translate into mutually rein-
forcing means to address the same legal problem.
A possible extrapolation of this notion of mutual re-
inforcement is that one narrative might engender the
other. For instance, if one looks at a certain area of
international law narrated as a constitutional project,
there are two ways in which this story can be told: one is
the area being as contributing to a constitutional project
of the whole of international law; and the other is that of
the area as constitutional within itself. The former is the
subject of Tzevelekos’ article, and he is overall positive
about the contribution of human rights to the wider
international legal order (even if he is wary about this
contribution being over-hyped). The latter, despite
being a legitimate way of telling a constitutional version
of (a part of) international law, necessarily engenders the
fragmentation of the broader legal project, as it creates
an autonomous, self-sufficient field of international law
in relation to the others. This idea, and its many dan-
gers, is evoked in Marjan Ajevski’s discussion of inter-
national criminal law as a constitutional project.
4. Narrating the Legal
International?
This brief introduction aimed at bringing together
points of intersection among the articles that follow, and
also raise some broader issues about the notion of an
international legal order and the ways in which we tell
its story. It is not my intention to provide any answers
to any of the issues raised here; rather, the intent of this
introduction, and of this entire special issue, is to plant
seeds that hopefully will blossom into critical engage-
ment with these narratives of the international legal
order.
If you do not think your work in international law
engages with any of these notions, think again. Work on
international legal issues necessarily advances a notion
of the international legal order, whether the author is
conscious of that or not. Our hope with this introduc-
tion and the articles that follow is to make the reader
aware of that, and have you consciously make a choice
about what international legal order, if any, you hope to
achieve at the end of the day, should your (our!) ideal
succeed. I hope you enjoy the reading!
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